Abstract: The article examines whether banks' funding structure amplifies procyclicality. Using data for GCC banks for the period 1996-2009, the evidence suggests that banks with higher wholesale dependence cut back lending by a greater amount. In addition, the procyclicality of the financial system and the crisis exacerbates the effect, although the results differ across bank ownership. Robustness checks lend credence to these findings.
Introduction
In recent times, the issue of procyclicality of banking firms has come into much prominence, as it was perceived to be one of the underlying causes of the recent financial crisis. Excessive procyclicality of bank lending may amplify macroeconomic fluctuations, thereby threatening the stability of the financial system. Quantifying these risks remains a challenge, especially since financial soundness indicators for banks tend to improve in the upward phase of the credit cycle. Country experiences suggest that credit booms can be associated with unsustainable domestic demand growth, overheating and asset price bubbles. Financial sector difficulties cannot be ruled out either, for example, loan losses following a protracted recession. How significant these risks are and what role should public policy play are key questions confronting policymakers.
In this context, whether and to what extent the funding structure of banks influences their lending behaviour has not been adequately addressed in the literature. Aggregate bank-level data for OECD economies indicates that in several of such countries (Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland) , deposits have steadily lost ground at the expense of non-deposit funds (ECB 2008a (ECB , 2009 ). This change in the funding composition was called into question in the wake of the recent financial meltdown. In particular, wholesale funding created significant maturity mismatches with banks devoting limited attention to the consequences of potential risks of drying up of such funds. As confidence withered and depositors began withdrawing their funds en masse, banks found it increasingly difficult to meet such large and sudden withdrawals and took recourse to interbank markets to fund maturity mismatches. With confidence in financial institutions having eroded, the interbank market also came to a standstill, leaving banks with no recourse but to seek government intervention. Across countries and continents, besides conventional (cuts in key policy rates, liquidity injections) and unconventional (collateral swaps, introduction of foreign currency swap lines, quantitative easing) policy measures, governments have heavily intervened in banks, including resorting to outright nationalization (as in United States, United Kingdom, Russia, Belgium), increasing depositor protection limits (as in United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, Hungary, Czech Republic), injecting capital in troubled banks (as in United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Switzerland, Russia), to mention a few.
Towards this end, this article focuses on the relationship between funding structure and bank lending for GCC countries. To the best of our knowledge, this is perhaps one of the early studies to explore such an interlinkage and most certainly for the GCC countries. The bank-level data enables to improve the accuracy of estimation and clearly discern the impact of funding structures on bank lending, and employ control variables so as to obtain "clean" estimates to the maximum permissible extent.
The GCC banking system provides a reasonable laboratory to examine this issue in a holistic fashion. These countries share similar economic and social characteristics and are essentially dependent on a single primary commodity for exports. On average, hydrocarbon accounts for nearly half of the region's GDP contributes over 70% of these countries merchandise exports and over threefifths of government revenues (IMF 2010a) . Following the oil boom, real GDP growth in these countries averaged over 6.5% during 2003-2008 as compared to less than 4% during the preceding 5 year period. Non-oil GDP growth improved markedly, averaging nearly 7.5% during this period (IMF 2010a (IMF , 2010b (IMF , 2011 . The fiscal and external positions also witnessed an upturn, providing headroom to the authorities for greater economic diversification, while allowing the surpluses to be invested for productive purposes.
The analysis employs a detailed bank-level data set. The core of the data is the information on bank's balance sheet and income expenditure details as published by Bankscope, a comprehensive, global database containing information on nearly 30,000 public and private banks globally. The data has been extensively utilized in cross-country banking research, including examination of issues relating to bank interest margin (Demirguc Kunt and Huizinga 1999) , market discipline and deposit insurance (Demirguc Kunt and Huizinga 2004) , privatization and bank performance (Boubakri et al. 2005) , foreign bank penetration (De Haas and Lelyveld 2006) , corporate governance and bank risk taking (Laeven and Levine 2009 ) and more recently, the impact of legal changes on bank lending (Haselman, Pistor, and Vig 2010) and relationship between bank efficiency and stock market performance (Liadaki and Gaganis 2010) .
To anticipate the results, the analysis indicates that banks with greater dependence on wholesale funds lowered their lending by a bigger amount. The procyclicality of the financial system and the crisis exacerbated the effect, although the impact was somewhat moderate for Islamic banks. The magnitude of the overall impact suggests that, for an average Islamic bank located in a country impacted by a crisis, bank lending would decline by roughly 2.4% in response to a 1% increase in wholesale dependence. Taking the procyclicality of the financial system into account, these magnitudes vary markedly across countries.
The present study contributes to the literature in several distinct ways. First, the study augments the emerging literature that explores the relevance of bank funding structures. In general, several studies appear to indicate that financial systems with greater reliance on wholesale funds were more severely affected by the recent global meltdown (Ratnovski and Huang 2009; Raddatz 2010) . Second, the study adds to the extant literature on bank lending by examining how wholesale dependence across different bank characteristics influences loan supply (Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez 2011) . Besides being an underresearched area of study, it is one of the few articles to examine this issue for GCC countries, which typically have bank-based financial systems. Finally, the paper complements a growing body of empirical research that explores the effects of the global financial crisis on the banking system. Several studies have examined the behaviour of U.S. banks during the crisis (Huang 2010; Boyson, Helwege, and Jindra 2011; Santos 2011) as well as for other countries, including Asia (Ree 2011) , African (Louis, Leonce, and Taoufik 2009) , EU (Gardo and Martin 2010) and GCC (IMF 2010a) banking systems. However, the interplay between bank lending and funding structure and how it was affected by the crisis is an aspect that has not been investigated in prior empirical research.
The remainder of the article continues as follows. The relevant literature is briefly reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 provides certain stylized facts regarding bank funding and lending in these countries. Section 4 sets up the empirical strategy, followed by the results (Section 5) and concluding remarks (Section 6).
Literature review
Several explanations have appeared in the literature to explain fluctuations in credit policies of banks. Bernanke and Gertler (1990) explain the phenomenon of procyclicality within a financial accelerator framework. With information asymmetry between banks and borrowers, economic upturns lead to an improvement in the valuation of potential collateral, making access to bank finance easier and fuelling credit demand. As downturn sets in and collateral values become depressed, banks deleverage by cutting back credit and recalling their loans, amplifying the credit contraction.
Another source of procyclicality is the financial sector misperception of risk by financial market participants, as reflected in banks' lending and investment decisions (Borio, Furfine, and Lowe 2001) . Market participants behave as if risk declines during the upswing phase and rises only when downturn sets in. This is caused mainly by difficulties in measuring the time dimension of risk, often leading to risk being under-estimated during boom times and over-estimated during downswings, creating laxity in credit standards during booms and tightening of such standards during downturns.
A third source of procyclicality can be traced to incorrect compensation structures. Once managers obtain a reasonable return on equity for their shareholders, they may engage in activities that depart from the firm's value maximization. To the extent that managers have limited liability, a manifestation of this possibility could be to favour high-risk return strategies (i.e., over extension of credit) in order to increase the social presence of bank managers or the power of managers in an enlarging organization (Williamson 1963) . The fact that compensation schemes could have been instrumental in intensifying procyclicality has also been recognized in recent policy documents (BIS 2009 ).
Competition among banks or between banks and other financial intermediaries can also engender procyclicality. A rise in bank competition may dampen profitability. To compensate for declining profitability, bank managers might sacrifice objectivity in credit evaluation standards and increase loan growth indiscriminately at the expense of the (future) quality of their loan portfolios (Keeley 1990; Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz 2000) .
Herd behaviour (Rajan 1994 ) might also help to explain why bank managers finance negative net present value projects during expansions. The fact that others are lending may be considered as invaluable information concerning the creditworthiness of a potential borrower. And importantly, managerial performance is generally judged relative to some benchmark. The disincentives for being wrong in company are generally much less than for making mistakes in isolation. Managers, as a result, have a strong incentive to behave as their peers, which, at an aggregate level, enhances lending booms and recessions.
Following from the institutional memory hypothesis, the extended passage of time since the last loan bust could impel banks to expand their loan book in order to garner greater market share. This could be the result of two complementary forces. First, the proportion of loan officers that experienced the last bust declines as the bank hires new, younger employees and the former ones retire, leading to an overall loss of learning experience. Second, some of the experienced officers might not be able to satisfactorily recollect the previous bust; the more far away is the earlier recession, the less likely is their recollection of the previous downturn. The culmination of these forces is an overall decline in the institutional memory, a cadre less skilful of comprehensively judging credit risk, presumably resulting in rapid loan expansion (Berger and Udell 2004) .
Banking sector liberalization could lead to credit booms not only as a result of increased profitable opportunities in more risky sectors but also as a result of increased competition for market share triggered by asymmetric information about the creditworthiness of borrowers (Dell'Ariccia 2001; Dell'Ariccia and Marquez 2006) . Countries with recently liberalized banking sectors tend to have a high proportion of borrowers with unknown creditworthiness. Banks attempt to garner greater market shares by loosening their credit requirements, leading to higher than expected demand for credit. As adverse selection sets in, repayments become difficult, compelling banks to cut back on their credit supply.
Several empirical studies have recently examined the procyclical nature of bank lending. The balance of evidence appears to suggest that lending rapidly increases during the growth phase, in effect implying that credit cycles would tend to amplify business cycles. Using Spanish bank-level data, Salas and Saurina (2002) find that economic shocks are quickly transmitted to Spanish banks. Employing a similar framework, Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina (2006) observe that collateral requirements are significantly compromised during a business upturn, fuelling a lending boom. Using UK banking data, Pain (2003) arrives at similar conclusions. Craig, Davis, and Pascual (2006) examine data for Asian banks and confirm procyclicality in their lending behaviour. Dell' Ariccia and Marquez (2006) predict that episodes of financial distress are more likely in the aftermath of strong credit expansion. Focusing specifically on the subprime episode, Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan (2008) find that lending standards tend to be compromised more in areas that experienced larger credit booms.
Another strand of the literature examines the use of wholesale funding and its role in the recent subprime crises. Ratnovski and Huang (2009) explore the factors behind the unusual resilience of Canadian banks during the recent global meltdown and find that they relied less on wholesale funding than their peers in other advanced countries. Rajan (2006) notes that banks' greater reliance on market liquidity makes their balance sheet more suspects in times of crisis. Demirguc Kunt and Huizinga (2010) found that banks' resilience on nondeposit funds increases their risk. Other studies show that banks that relied heavily on wholesale funds were more affected by the liquidity crunch, experienced a large abnormal decline in their share prices (Adrian and Shin 2009; Raddatz 2010) . In effect, the evidence strongly suggests that greater use of wholesale funding exposed banks to newer types of risks that were not accounted for in their risk management practices, leading them to ultimately cut back on their lending activities.
Closer to the region, Khamis (2010) provides an overview of the financial crisis on GCC countries. Al Hassan, Khamis, and Oulidi (2010) analyze the banking sector in the GCC economies, including trends in ownership, balance sheet exposures and risks. Espinosa and Prasad (2010) analyze the delinquent loans in GCC banks and find that a decline in non-oil GDP growth by 3 percentage points would raise NPLs by roughly 0.3%. None of the studies, however, investigate the interlinkage between bank lending and their funding structure and this remains central to the empirical inquiry of the paper.
Credit growth and funding mix: stylized facts
The oil boom since the early 2000 led to rapid improvements in economic growth in the GCC countries, so much so that the banking sector experienced rapid credit growth. In real terms, credit growth averaged well over 20% during [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , leading to a sharp rise in the credit-to-GDP ratio in most of these countries. By way of example, the credit-to-GDP ratio, which ranged from 25 to 50% in 2001 in the GCC countries increased sharply thereafter to range between 32 and 65% during 2002 (World Bank 2010 . Together with benign interest rates and buoyant economic activity, this supported higher demand for real estate and equities, pushing up prices across the region (Figure 1 ). Following Raddatz (2010), we define retail dependence (Retail) as the ratio of retail deposits to total liabilities, where retail deposits is total deposits netted for bank deposits. We transform this variable, according as:
so that higher values of Wholesale represent greater reliance on wholesale deposits. The Appendix provides a description of the relevant variables, including summary statistics and data sources. Figures 2 and 3 provide the trend in retail dependence of banks, classified according to country-year and bank group, respectively. On average, United Arab Emirates (AE) and Saudi Arabia (SA) exhibit the highest retail dependence (and consequently, the lowest wholesale dependence), whereas wholesale dependence is highest for Bahrain banks (Figure 2 ). Examining the pattern according to bank groups, the graph indicates that Islamic banks display relatively lower dependence on wholesale deposits as compared to commercial banks ( Figure 3 ).
Database and empirical strategy
The present data covers the period 1996-2009. We started off with a total of over 100 banks, but subsequently deleted the finance and investment companies, including investment banks, leaving us with 80 banks. Several banks also Funding Structure, Procyclicality and Lending do not report data on some relevant variables required for the analysis, such as the dependent variable (or some of its components). These banks were therefore excluded from the analysis. Finally, to moderate the influence of outliers, we winsorized the top and bottom 1% of observations for the dependent variable. This left us with data on 67 banks at an average of 9.1 years of observation per year, with a total of 645 bank-years. Table 1 provides the details. Table 2 lists the reliance on retail funding by GCC banks during the sample period, by ownership (Panel A), by country (Panel B) and by crisis (Panel C). Later in the analysis, we employ dummy variables to control for these characteristics. Without loss of generality, it appears that Islamic banks display greater reliance on retail deposits as compared to commercial banks. Turning to country-level variations, the evidence strongly suggests wide divergence across countries in terms of their retail dependence. Banks in Bahrain and Kuwait are observed to exhibit lowest retail dependence. Consider, for example, banks in Bahrain. On average, roughly 50% of their deposits are retail as compared to nearly 85% in case of Qatari banks. This difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. In most of the other instances, and especially for Bahrain and Kuwait banks, their differences vis-avis banks in other countries are statistically significant as well.
Banks also appear to have increased their wholesale dependence, especially during the crisis. To see this, note that prior to the crisis, nearly 77% of overall banks deposits were retail in nature. This declined to around 66% during the crisis. The difference is observed to be statistically significant.
Looking at real loan growth, the evidence indicates that commercial banks expanded their loan book at a much faster rate as compared to Islamic banks. These differences are observed to be statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In terms of country-level differences in loan expansion, the evidence indicates that loan growth was much more subdued in Oman and Saudi Arabia as compared to their other GCC neighbours. Loan growth in Oman was significantly lower than in most other countries. As well, AE banks loan book grew strongly as compared to Saudi Arabia. These differences were strongly significant at conventional levels.
The correlation matrix in Table 3 shows that bigger, capitalized and efficient banks tend to rely less on wholesale deposits. At the macroeconomic level, higher inflation prompts banks to lower their wholesale dependence. Most importantly, the results clearly suggest that loan growth is lower for banks with greater reliance on wholesale funds, although the magnitude of the correlation is about 25%. Loan growth is impacted positively by the macroeconomic environment. Islamic banks appear to exhibit lower loan growth as compared to commercial banks. These raw correlations however, do not take on board either bank-specific or business cycle considerations. Notes: Standard deviation within parentheses; ***, **and *denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. Funding Structure, Procyclicality and Lending
The univariate results in Table 2 are strongly supportive of significant differences across banks in terms of their retail dependence. The subsequent correlation analysis is also suggestive of differences in loan growth across banks, depending on their extent of wholesale dependence or bank ownership. These tests do not take into consideration several bank-specific variables. By way of example, lending could differ by bank size. The soundness and fragility of banks could also be an important consideration. Similarly, the state of the banking industry as also the macroeconomic environment could impinge on bank lending. Taking these concerns on board, we employ a multivariate regression framework, by specifying a reduced-form equation for bank b in country c of the following form:
½2
where ΔLoans is the real growth rate of loans (measured as the difference between log-loans at time t and log-loans at time t-1), BANK is a matrix of bank-level variables included with a lag to avoid endogeneity problems, SYS is the banking industry-level variables, including measures of financial development (proxied by bank credit to GDP) and concentration (asset share of three largest banks), MACRO is the set of macroeconomic variables such as inflation (proxied by change in GDP deflator) and real non-oil GDP growth (GROWTH), the measure of job-creating economic activity in these countries (IMF 2010a) . ISLAMIC is the ownership dummy for Islamic banks, COUNTRY are the fixed effects that controls for country-specific factors (geography, institutions, etc.) and CRISIS 2008-09 is a dummy to take into account the recent economic crisis.
Finally, e b,c is the error term. The coefficients of interest are Wholesale -the dependence on wholesale funds by bank b in country c -and its interaction terms. A positive (negative) estimate of φ 2 would indicate that banks with greater dependence on wholesale funds tend to lower lending. The interaction term of wholesale dependence with GDP growth enables to discern procyclicality in bank lending: to the extent that banks with greater wholesale dependence lower lending in an economic upturn, the coefficient on φ 3 would be negative. As a result, if the φ 3 coefficient is positive and large enough to outweigh a negative value of φ 2 , this would suggest that banks with greater wholesale dependence tend to over-extend credit in the upturn of the business cycle, since the value of (φ 2 + φ 3 ) increases (for a positive estimate of φ 3 ), indicating greater sensitivity of lending to economic growth for such banks. Similar interpretations can be advanced for the other interaction terms.
Funding strategy of banks is, however, likely to be endogenous. A case in point was the recent subprime crisis, where banks funding pattern was an important consideration behind their lending strategy. Employing data on syndicated loans, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that new loan to large borrowers fell during the recent financial crisis and that this decrease was larger among banks with less deposit financing. Using data on US insured commercial banks for 2006:q1-2009:q4, Gozzi and Goetz (2010) show that, during the crisis, banks with higher exposure to wholesale funding markets decreased their lending by a greater magnitude. Cornett et al. (2011) also provide evidence to suggest that banks with more stable sources of funding were better able to continue lending. As a result, we follow a two-stage regression procedure. In stage 1, banks' wholesale dependence is regressed on a set of exogenous variables. This provides us the value of predicted wholesale dependence. To complete the procedure, eq. [2] is estimated after replacing wholesale dependence by its predicted value.
The literature identifies several determinants of banks' funding strategy (BIS 2010). These include, inter alia, scale economies (a minimum size allows banks to better diversify their funding sources), market power (greater market power might facilitate banks' access to retail deposits) and overhead costs (higher overhead costs might impel banks to compensate for the same by increasing reliance on wholesale funds). At the macroeconomic level, we include per capita GDP (GDP/population), inflation and the real non-oil GDP growth (GROWTH). 1 Accordingly, we employ a dynamic specification for determining the banks' funding strategy as given by eq. [3]:
where the variables are as defined earlier. The error term (v) is assumed to comprise of a bank-specific component μ i and white noise, ε s,t , such that u s,t ¼ μ i þ ε s,t where μ i~I ID (0, σ u 2 ) and ε i~I ID (0, σ ε 2 ), independent of each other and among themselves.
The empirical estimation proceeds in several stages. First, we estimate eq.
[2] as above, using real loan growth as the dependent variable and addressing the endogenity issue. However, as observed earlier, some countries have more observations than others. Therefore, the results could be driven by countries with a disproportionately larger number of observations. Following recent research (Micco, Panizza, and Yanez 2007) , we address this issue by weighing each observation by 1/N b,t (i.e., the bank's share in total assets in country b in year t). In the final stage, we split the sample with regard to size, capitalization and liquidity. This is in the spirit of the literature on the bank lending channel which suggests that these characteristics play an important role in explaining the behaviour of bank lending to monetary policy changes Stein 1995, 2000; Peek and Rosengren 1995; Kishan and Opiela 2000) .
In all regressions, we use a standard set of control variables, the importance of which has been emphasized in recent research (Berger et al. 2005 ; Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan 2008, Nier and Zicchino 2005) . We use both total size (proxied by log of total asset, LTA) and relative size (proxied by asset of a given bank in a country c in a given year to total bank asset in the country in that year, SHTA). The first variable controls for scale economies and the second controls for market power. Besides, we include measures of capitalization (proxied by equity-to-total asset ratio, EQTY), liquidity (proxied by the liquid asset-to-total asset ratio, LQDTY) and non-interest income (proxied by fee income-to-total asset ratio, FEE). The rationale for employing the latter set of variables is that capitalization and liquidity tends to differ between Islamic and commercial banks owing to their different business profile and non-interest income tends to be higher for banks that derive a major part of their income from commissions. Throughout the analysis, the reported standard errors take on board the possibility of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity pertaining to the same bank (i.e., bank-level clustered standard errors).
Discussion of the results

Determinants of wholesale dependence
The inclusion of lagged-dependent variable (LDV) in eq. [3] renders static panel estimation inconsistent. As a consequence, we resort to the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator in Arellano and Bond (1991) to obtain consistent estimates of the above model. With respect to the validity of instruments, we conduct a Sargan test for the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. We use the lags of all variables (in levels) from the second lag as instruments.
The consistency of the estimates also depends on the absence of serial correlation in the error terms. This will be the case if the differenced residuals display significant negative first-order serial correlation and no second-order serial correlation. We present tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation related to the estimated residuals in first differences. The test statistics are asymptotically distributed as standard normal variables. The null hypothesis here relates to insignificance, so that a low p-value for the test on first-order serial correlation and a high p-value for the test on second-order serial correlation suggest that the disturbances are not serially correlated.
We first detail the first-step regressions, which study the determinants of banks' wholesale dependence. The results, reported in Table 4 , show that we are not able to reject the Sargan test. Moreover, we are not able to reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation. In other words, this suggests that the GMM model is well specified.
Regarding the explanatory variables, there is evidence of high level of persistence in the dependent variable. Most control variables exhibit expected signs. Smaller banks with higher overheads tend to display greater wholesale dependence. The point estimates suggest that an increase in banks size by 10% lowers wholesale dependence by nearly 1%. Among the macroeconomic variables, relatively well-off countries with lower inflation tend to rely more on wholesale funds.
Determinants of bank loan growth
The first stage of the regressions provides us with the predicted values of wholesale dependence. We use these predicted values for the second-stage regressions, as outlined in eq. [2] . The regression results are set out in Table 5 . (2) 0.000; 0.126
Notes: Standard errors within parentheses; ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively; AR (1) and AR (2) are the first-and second-order autocorrelation and follows N(0, 1).
Funding Structure, Procyclicality and Lending First, we briefly discuss the control variables. Well-capitalized banks appear to extend more credit. This is consistent with the literature which suggests that bank soundness is an important factor influencing their credit decisions (Nier and Zicchino 2005) . At the banking industry level, higher levels of concentration, by lowering competition, act as a brake on credit. On the other hand, higher levels of financial development appear to create a conducive environment of credit expansion. The evidence conclusively points to the fact that recent financial crisis has exerted a negative impact on banks' credit growth. At the macroeconomic level, higher GDP growth, by raising economic activity, improves credit growth. Private credit increases with inflation, but less than oneto-one, implying that inflation, in fact, dampens real private credit growth (Guo and Stepanyan 2011) .
After controlling for other factors including country effects, the results strongly support the fact that banks with higher wholesale dependence tend to decrease lending. The relation is economically meaningful, as well. For example, a 1% increase in wholesale dependence reduces real loan growth roughly 3%. A coefficient above unity on wholesale dependence indicates that bank credit grows more than proportionally with reduced reliance on wholesale funds, which is not surprising, given the nature of bank-based nature of financial systems that typifies these economies.
Column (2) includes the interaction terms. The effect of the business cycle variable is extremely large. Consider, for instance, the impact of the economic activity variable on bank credit in the country where real non-oil GDP grew by 6%, the median growth rate in the sample. Ignoring the impact of the business cycle, the effect is approximately 2.3 percentage points. However, if the impact of the business cycle is taken into account, the point estimates of Col. (2) yield an estimate of approximately 2.7 percentage points (¼ -2.3-0.06 × 6.4).
Column (3) considers the response to bank lending by Islamic banks. The point estimates in Col. (3) indicate that Islamic banks with greater wholesale dependence cut their bank lending by a relatively lower magnitude as compared to commercial banks. Whereas overall, banks lowered their lending by roughly 3.1% in response to a 1% rise in wholesale dependence, for Islamic banks, these magnitudes were lower by about 20% (¼-3.051 þ 0.629). Using cross-country data on roughly 120 banks in several countries with significant commercial and Islamic bank presence, Hasan and Dridi (2010) conclude that credit growth by the latter group were relatively less affected by the crisis, a finding consistent with the current analysis.
Column (4) considers the impact of the crisis on loan growth. Here again, the analysis is a pointer to the fact that the crisis exacerbated the dampening impact on credit growth, lowering it by as much as 23% (¼-0.669 × 100/2.902).
The final column considers the impact of all the relevant variables, taken together. The estimates on wholesale and its interaction terms suggest that the impact of growth on bank lending is quite large. To obtain a better sense of the magnitudes, we examine the differential in bank lending of an average Islamic bank located in a country impacted by a crisis. The point estimates in Col. (5) suggest that, in such as case, bank lending would have been lower by roughly 2.37% (¼-2.71 þ 0.91-0.57). Taking on board the growth impact, the magnitudes are extremely large. Consider, for instance, a country with a growth of 4.1%, the lowest average growth in the sample. For such a country, the overall magnitude of the impact would be of the order of -2.7% (=2.37-8.151 × 0.041). On the other hand, for the country with a growth of 9.8% -the highest average growth in the sample -the point estimates yield a magnitude of nearly 3.2% (¼2.37-8.151 × 0.098) -a difference of nearly 20% as compared to the previous estimate.
Summing up, the results indicate that banks with greater wholesale dependence did cut back their lending; the impact was exacerbated by business cycle considerations.
Robustness
As mentioned earlier, the results could be driven by the disproportionate number of observations across countries. The fact that this is the case seems to be vindicated by Table 1 . To address this issue, we weight each observation by the bank's share of total assets in the country (Micco, Panizza, and Yanez 2007) . This is tantamount to giving each country the same weight. The revised estimates are presented in Table 6 .
These results validate previous findings. The magnitudes of the coefficients are also similar. Consider, by way of example, Table 6 , Col. (5), which includes all possible interaction terms. Ignoring the growth angle, the impact on lending by Islamic banks during the crisis is of the order of -1.7% (¼-2.54 þ 1.12-0.28). Taking on board the impact of growth, the magnitude is nearly 35% larger -of the order of -2.3% -for the country with median growth in the sample.
Among the control variables, in addition to capital as earlier, liquidity also appears to play an important role in bank lending: the coefficient is observed to be uniformly significant across all specifications.
In essence, the results attest to the fact that wholesale dependence by banks played an important role in their lending behaviour, a phenomenon that was exacerbated by procyclicality. Islamic banks, however, given the nature of their 1996 -2009 1996 -2009 1996 -2009 1996 -2009 1996 -2009 No. of 
Alternate bank characteristics
In this section, we conduct further analysis to shed more light on which bank characteristics were more relevant in impacting bank lending. Drawing from the literature on bank lending channel, in order to explore the possible distributive effects, we categorize banks according to size, capitalization and liquidity and examine the behaviour of banks in these categories at the top and bottom 25 percentile of the distribution. Since the control variables are unaltered in sign and significance, the table highlights only the main coefficients of interest.
To start with, Table 7 (Panel A) reports the results of regression for bank assets; the subsequent two panels focus on capital and liquidity, respectively. With regard to assets, although wholesale funding appears to have dampened bank lending at the top and bottom percentile, the impact was much higher for banks at the top end. In absolute terms, the magnitude of the coefficient on Wholesale for the top 25 percentile of banks exceeds that for the bottom 25 percentile in most cases. As to the magnitude of the overall impact, note that, for the bottom 25 percentile by assets, the overall impact of wholesale dependence on bank lending is roughly 5.7 (¼-4.4-1.3): in other words, taking into account the wholesale dependence, the crisis lowered lending by these banks bank by nearly 5.7%. At the top 25 percentile, over and above the crisis effect, there was also a growth effect; in essence, a median growth of 6% dampened bank lending by about (¼ -4.88-1.17-22 .69 Â 0.06), or nearly 7.5%. For Islamic banks, the impact was a bit moderate, of the order of (-7.4 þ 2.7), i.e., 4.7%.
Panel B presents the results with regard to capitalization. In this case, the results are much less compelling; the top 25 percentile by capital do not appear to have been impacted in any significant fashion. For the bottom 25 percentile, the impact is much lower. There is only an impact of the crisis on bank lending, over and above the impact of wholesale dependence. No discernible impact of either growth or Islamic banks on bank lending is in evidence.
Finally, examining the lending profile of banks with regard to their liquidity, the results point to a "pure" impact of only wholesale dependence on bank lending and that too for the top 25 percentile of banks by liquidity in select 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009; 1996-2009 Notes: Standard errors (clustered by banks) within parentheses; All the regressions take into account the full set of controls and dummy variables, but these are not reported; ***, **and *denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
cases. By way of example, a 1% increase in wholesale dependence is observed to lower bank lending by nearly 4%. One possible reason for the apparent unresponsiveness of Islamic banks in this respect could be that, in the absence of adequate infrastructure for liquidity risk management, Islamic banks tend to have an overly liquid balance sheet (i.e., with more cash and near-cash assets). Contextually, Khan and Bhatti (2008) find that Islamic financial institutions carry 40% more liquidity than their conventional counterparts. This approach to liquidity management, while not ideal, appears to have enabled them to mitigate the possible headwinds during the crisis.
Concluding remarks
The issue of procyclicality in bank lending has come into sharp focus following the recent financial crisis. Standard-setting bodies and regulators have been making efforts at developing macroprudential instruments to mitigate such procyclicality (BIS 2009; IMF 2009; Caruana 2010) . One area of concern has been the role played by banks' funding pattern in influencing such procyclical behaviour. Using disaggregated data on GCC banks for 1996-2009, the paper employs panel data techniques to explore the lending behaviour of GCC banks that incorporates the period of the recent economic crisis. The analysis indicates significant differences in banks' lending as well as funding patterns, judged in terms of ownership, countries and even the pre-and post-crisis periods. More specifically, banks with greater dependence on wholesale funds appear to have cut back lending by a significant amount. The procyclicality of the financial system and the crisis exacerbated the effect, although the impact was a bit moderate for Islamic banks. These results are quite robust. It is apparent in simple univariate comparisons as well as in multivariate regressions that control for various bank-level, banking industry-level and macroeconomic variables. Robustness checks of the results based on alternate estimation techniques appear to lend credence to these findings. These findings are in congruence with recent research (Hasan and Dridi 2010) .
We also examine the behaviour of the top and bottom 25 percentile of banks classified according to different bank characteristics, such as size, liquidity and capitalization. The results appear to indicate that the impact with respect to assets and liquidity were more pronounced at the top end, whereas with respect of capital, it was for the bottom 25 percentile of banks that the effect was much more pronounced. In terms of specifics, for the top 25 percentile by assets, there was a both a "growth" and a "crisis" effect, whereas for the bottom 25 percentile, there was only a "crisis" effect. There was no effect whatsoever on lending for either the top 25 percentile of banks by capital or for that matter, the lowest 25 percentile by liquidity.
The findings have important ramifications, some of which are already being taken on board in recent policymaking. For one, it appears that traditional banks -with a reliance on deposit funding -are relatively safe as compared to those with have a high proportion of non-deposit funds in their liability mix. Illustratively, countries (UK, Spain, Iceland, Ireland) and banks (Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley in the UK, Fortisbank of Belgium, 3 UBS and Credit
Suisse of Switzerland) with overt reliance on wholesale funding seem to have been hit hardest by the recent crisis. Therefore, in conjunction with other monetary and prudential ratios, the banks' funding composition can also provide important signals to policymakers regarding their health and viability. Second, uncontrolled expansion of the loan book in the quest for garnering market share could be a recipe for future problems. Across countries, over-stretched financial systems and "search for yields" have been found to lead to riskier banking systems, leading commentators to seek for imposition of "speed limits" (Honohan 1997) , either on their loan book or on segments that appear in danger of over-extension. Macroprudential measures to moderate growth in certain segments of the financial sector have been undertaken in several countries such as India (commercial real estate lending), Korea (credit card business), Indonesia (housing loans), Estonia (residential property), Portugal (housing loans) and Romania (consumer and mortgage loans). Others, most notably, Spain (Poveda 2000) and more recently, Peru (Breuer, Gasha, and Peschiera 2009 ) have introduced a system of dynamic provisioning. Contextually, Flannery (2005) has proposed a "contingent capital" arrangement, which can be contracted in good times when the economy is in an upswing and are therefore relatively cheap (compared to raising new capital in the midst of a recession) and thereby, easier to enforce (Rajan 2009a (Rajan , 2009b (Rajan , 2009c . Prior to the crisis, there was a growing trend worldwide towards universal banking, so that banks were relying on a combination of deposit and nondeposit funding to support their asset book. The crisis demonstrated that, while such a strategy could entail substantial benefits to the bank in terms of scale and scope economies, there are limits as to how far banks can veer away from traditional banking models, especially if they are to conduct their business in a safe and cost-efficient manner. 
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